Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem for a time-varying multi-agent network consisting of two subnetworks, where the two subnetworks share the same objective function. We first propose a subgradientbased distributed algorithm with heterogeneous stepsizes to compute a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game. We then prove that the proposed algorithm can achieve a Nash equilibrium under uniformly jointly strongly connected (UJSC) weight-balanced digraphs with homogenous stepsizes. Moreover, we demonstrate that for weighted-unbalanced graphs a Nash equilibrium may not be achieved with homogenous stepsizes unless certain conditions on the objective function hold. We show that there always exist heterogeneous stepsizes for the proposed algorithm to guarantee that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved for UJSC digraphs. Finally, in two standard weight-unbalanced cases, we verify the convergence to a Nash equilibrium by adaptively updating the stepsizes along with the arc weights in the proposed algorithm.
agents via distributed algorithm design and local information exchange [8] , [9] , [14] , [15] , [20] [21] [22] , [37] .
Distributed optimization has been widely investigated for agents to achieve a global optimization objective by cooperating with each other [14] , [15] , [20] [21] [22] . Furthermore, distributed optimization algorithms in the presence of adversaries have gained rapidly growing interest [2] , [3] , [23] , [30] [31] [32] . For instance, a non-model based approach was proposed for seeking a Nash equilibrium of noncooperative games in [30] , while distributed methods to compute Nash equilibria based on extreme-seeking technique were developed in [31] . A distributed continuous-time set-valued dynamical system solution to seek a Nash equilibrium of zero-sum games was first designed for undirected graphs and then for weight-balanced directed graphs in [23] . It is worthwhile to mention that, in the special case of additively separable objective functions, the considered distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem is equivalent to the well-known distributed optimization problem: multiple agents cooperatively minimize a sum of their own convex objective functions [11] , [12] , [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , [24] , [29] .
One main approach to distributed optimization is based on subgradient algorithms with each node computing a subgradient of its own objective function. Distributed subgradientbased algorithms with constant and time-varying stepsizes, respectively, were proposed in [14] and [15] with detailed convergence analysis. A distributed iterative algorithm that avoids choosing a diminishing stepsize was proposed in [29] . Both deterministic and randomized versions of distributed projectionbased protocols were studied in [20] [21] [22] .
In existing works on distributed optimization, most of the results were obtained for switching weight-balanced graphs because there usually exists a common Lyapunov function to facilitate the convergence analysis in this case [14] , [15] , [18] , [23] , [24] . Sometimes, the weight-balance condition is hard to preserve in the case when the graph is time-varying and with communication delays [38] , and it may be quite restrictive and difficult to verify in a distributed setting. However, in the case of weight-unbalanced graphs, there may not exist a common (quadratic) Lyapunov function or it may be very hard to construct one even for simple consensus problems [10] , and hence, the convergence analysis of distributed problems become extremely difficult. Recently, many efforts have been made to handle the weight unbalance problem, though very few results have been obtained on distributed optimization. For instance, the effect of the Perron vector of the adjacency matrix on the optimal convergence of distributed subgradient and dual averaging algorithms were investigated for a fixed 0018-9286 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
weight-unbalanced graph in [39] and [40] . Some methods were developed for the unbalanced graph case such as the reweighting technique [39] (for a fixed graph with a known Perron vector) and the subgradient-push methods [41] , [42] (where each node has to know its out-degree all the time). To our knowledge, there are no theoretical results on distributed Nash equilibrium computation for switching weight-unbalanced graphs.
In this paper, we consider the distributed zero-sum game Nash equilibrium computation problem proposed in [23] , where a multi-agent network consisting of two subnetworks, with one minimizing the objective function and the other maximizing it. The agents play a zero-sum game. The agents in two different subnetworks play antagonistic roles against each other, while the agents in the same subnetwork cooperate. The objective of the network is to achieve a Nash equilibrium via distributed computation based on local communications under time-varying connectivity. The considered Nash equilibrium computation problem is motivated by power allocation problems [23] and saddle point searching problems arising from Lagrangian dual optimization problems [13] , [18] , [25] [26] [27] [28] . The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a subgradient-based distributed algorithm to compute a saddle-point Nash equilibrium under timevarying graphs, and show that our algorithm with homogeneous stepsizes can achieve a Nash equilibrium under uniformly jointly strongly connected (UJSC) weightbalanced digraphs.
• We further consider the weight-unbalanced case, though most existing results on distributed optimization were obtained for weight-balanced graphs, and show that distributed homogeneous-stepsize algorithms may fail in the unbalanced case, even for the special case of identical subnetworks.
• We propose a heterogeneous stepsize rule and study how to cooperatively find a Nash equilibrium in general weight-unbalanced cases. We find that, for UJSC timevarying digraphs, there always exist (heterogeneous) stepsizes to make the network achieve a Nash equilibrium. Then we construct an adaptive algorithm to update the stepsizes to achieve a Nash equilibrium in two standard cases: one with a common left eigenvector associated with eigenvalue one of adjacency matrices and the other with periodically switching graphs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives some preliminary knowledge, while Section III formulates the distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem and proposes a novel algorithm. Section IV provides the main results followed by Section V that contains all the proofs of the results. Then Section VI provides numerical simulations for illustration. Finally, Section VII gives some concluding remarks.
Notations: | · | denotes the Euclidean norm, ·, · the Euclidean inner product and ⊗ the Kronecker product. B(z, ε) is a ball with z the center and ε > 0 the radius, S
is the set of all n-dimensional positive stochastic vectors. z denotes the transpose of vector z, A ij the i-th row and j-th column entry of matrix A and diag{c 1 , . . . , c n } the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements c 1 , . . . , c n . 1 = (1, . . . , 1) is the vector of all ones with appropriate dimension.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give preliminaries on graph theory [4] , convex analysis [5] , and Nash equilibrium.
A. Graph Theory
A digraph (directed graph)Ḡ = (V,Ē) consists of a node setV = {1, . . . ,n} and an arc setĒ ⊆V ×V. Associated with graphḠ, there is a (weighted) adjacency matrixĀ = (ā ij ) ∈ Rn ×n with nonnegative adjacency elementsā ij , which are positive if and only if (j, i) ∈Ē. Node j is a neighbor of node
Consider a multi-agent network Ξ consisting of two subnetworks Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 with respective n 1 and n 2 agents. Ξ is described by a digraph, denoted as G = (V, E), which contains self-loops, i.e., (i, i) ∈ E for each i. Here G can be partitioned into three digraphs: G = (V , E ) with V = {ω 1 , . . . , ω n }, = 1, 2, and a bipartite graph G = (V, E ), where V = V 1 V 2 and E = E 1 E 2 E . In other words, Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are described by the two digraphs, G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and the interconnection between Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 is described by G . Here G is called bipartite without isolated nodes if, for any i ∈ V , there is at least one node j ∈ V 3− such that (j, i) ∈ E for = 1, 2. Let A denote the adjacency matrix of G , = 1, 2. Digraph G is strongly connected if there is a path in G from i to j for any pair node i, j ∈ V . A node is called a root node if there is at least a path from this node to any other node. In the sequel, we still write i ∈ V instead of ω i ∈ V , = 1, 2 for simplicity if there is no confusion.
Let A = (a ij , i,j∈V ) ∈ R n ×n be the adjacency matrix of G . Graph G is weight-balanced if j∈V a ij = j∈V a ji for i ∈ V ; and weight-unbalanced otherwise.
A vector is said to be stochastic if all its components are nonnegative and the sum of its components is one. A matrix is a stochastic matrix if each of its row vectors is stochastic. A stochastic vector is positive if all its components are positive.
Let B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n be a stochastic matrix. Define G B = ({1, . . . , n}, E B ) as the graph associated with B, where (j, i) ∈ E B if and only if b ij > 0 (its adjacency matrix is B). According to Perron-Frobenius theorem [1] , there is a unique positive stochastic left eigenvector of B associated with eigenvalue one if G B is strongly connected. We call this eigenvector the Perron vector of B.
B. Convex Analysis
m , we can associate with any z ∈ R m a unique element P K (z) ∈ K satisfying |z − P K (z)| = inf y∈K |z − y|, where P K is the projection operator onto K. The following property for the convex projection operator P K holds by Lemma 1 (b) in [15] |P K (y) − z| ≤ |y − z| for any y ∈ R m and any z ∈ K.
(1)
The set of all subgradients of (convex or concave) function ϕ atẑ is denoted by ∂ϕ(ẑ), which is called the subdifferential of ϕ atẑ.
C. Saddle Point and Nash Equilibrium
convexconcave if it is (strictly) convex in first argument and (strictly) concave in second one. Given a point (x,ŷ), we denote by ∂ x φ(x,ŷ) the subdifferential of convex function φ(·,ŷ) atx and
The next lemma presents a necessary and sufficient condition to characterize the saddle points (see Proposition 2.6.1 in [33] Remark 2.1: Denote byZ the set of all saddle points of function φ on X × Y ,X andȲ the optimal solution sets of optimization problems (2) and (3), respectively. Then from Lemma 2.1 it is not hard to find that ifZ is nonempty, then X,Ȳ are nonempty, convex, andZ =X ×Ȳ . Moreover, if X and Y are convex, compact and φ is convex-concave, thenZ is nonempty (see Proposition 2.6.9 in [33] ).
The saddle point computation can be related to a zerosum game. In fact, a (strategic) game is described as a triple (I, W, U), where I is the set of all players; 
for each i ∈ V and w i ∈ W i . The Nash equilibria set of a two-person zero-sum game (n = 2, u 1 + u 2 = 0) is exactly the saddle point set of payoff function u 2 .
III. DISTRIBUTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
In this section, we introduce a distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem and then propose a subgradient-based algorithm as a solution.
Consider a network Ξ consisting of two subnetworks Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 . Agent i in Ξ 1 is associated with a convex-concave objective function f i (x, y) : R m 1 × R m 2 → R, and agent i in Ξ 2 is associated with a convex-concave objective function
Each agent only knows its own objective function. The two subnetworks have a common sum objective function with closed convex constraint sets
Then the network is engaged in a (generalized) zero-sum game
, where Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are viewed as two players, their respective payoff functions are u
The objective of Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 is to achieve a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game.
Remark 3.1: Despite that the contribution of this paper is mainly theoretical, the considered model appears also in applications. Here we illustrate that by discussing two practical examples in the literature. In the first example, from [23] note that for multiple Gaussian communication channels with budget constrained signal power and noise levels, the capacity of each channel is concave in signal power and convex in noise level. Suppose there are two subnetworks, one of which is more critical than the other. The critical subnetwork aims to maximize its capacity by raising its transmission power while the other aims to reduce the interference to other channels by minimizing its transmission power (and thus the capacity). The objective of the two subnetworks is then to find the Nash equilibrium of the sum of all channels' capacities, see Remark 3.1 in [23] for more details. For the second example, recall that many practical problems (for example, distributed estimation, resource allocation, optimal flow control) can be formulated as distributed convex constrained optimization problems, in which the associated Lagrangian function can be expressed as a sum of individual Lagrangian functions, which are convex in the optimization variable and linear (hence concave) in the Lagrangian multiplier. Under Salter's condition, the optimal solutions can be found by computing the saddle-points of the convex-concave Lagrangian function, or equivalently, the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding zero-sum game, see [18] for further discussions. We next provide a basic assumption. A1 (Existence of Saddle Points) For each stochastic vector μ,
Clearly, A1 holds if X and Y are bounded (see Proposition 2.6.9 in [33] for other conditions guaranteeing the existence of saddle points). However, in this paper we do not require X and Y to be bounded. Let
denote the set of all saddle points of U on X ×Y . Notice that X * ×Y * is also the set of Nash equilibria of the generalized zero-sum game.
Denote the state of node i ∈ V 1 as
The network Ξ is said to achieve a Nash equilibrium if, for any initial condition
The interconnection in the network Ξ is time-varying and modeled as three digraph sequences
are the graphs to describe subnetworks Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 , respectively, and G (k) = (V, E (k)) is the bipartite graph to describe the interconnection between Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 at time k ≥ 0 (see Fig. 1 
) the union graph with node set V and arc set
The following assumption on connectivity is made. A2 (Connectivity) (i) The graph sequence G is uniformly jointly bipartite; namely, there is an integer T > 0 such that G ([k, k + T )) is bipartite without isolated nodes for k ≥ 0.
(ii) For = 1, 2, the graph sequence G is uniformly jointly strongly connected (UJSC); namely, there is an integer
The agents in Ξ connect directly with those in Ξ 3− for all the time in [23] , while the agents in two subnetworks are connected at least once in each interval of length T according to A2 (i). In fact, it may be practically hard for the agents of different subnetworks to maintain communications all the time. Moreover, even if each agent in Ξ can receive the information from Ξ 3− , agents may just send or receive once during a period of length T to save energy or communication cost.
To handle the distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem, we propose a subgradient-based algorithm, called
where
is the set of neighbors in V of node i at time k, and
which is the last time before k when node i ∈ V has at least one neighbor in
, the considered distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem is equivalent to two separated distributed optimization problems with respective objective functions
(y) and constraint sets X, Y . In this case, the set of Nash equilibria is given by
Since
, algorithm (4) becomes in this case the well-known distributed subgradient algorithms [14] , [15] .
Remark 3.4:
To deal with weight-unbalanced graphs, some methods, the rescaling technique [34] and the push-sum protocols [35] , [36] , [38] have been proposed for average consensus problems; reweighting the objectives [39] and the subgradientpush protocols [41] , [42] for distributed optimization problems. Different from these methods, in this paper we propose a distributed algorithm to handle weight-unbalanced graphs when the stepsizes taken by agents are not necessarily the same.
Remark 3.5: Different from the extreme-seeking techniques used in [30] and [31] , our method uses the subgradient to compute the Nash equilibrium.
The next assumption was also used in [14] , [15] , [18] , and [21] .
Conditions (ii) and (iii) in A3 state that the information from an agent's neighbors is used through a weighted average. The next assumption is about subgradients of objective functions.
Obviously, A4 holds if X and Y are bounded. A similar bounded assumption has been widely used in distributed optimization [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Note that the stepsize in our algorithm (4) is heterogenous, i.e., the stepsizes may be different for different agents, in order to deal with general unbalanced cases. One challenging problem is how to select the stepsizes {α i,k } and {β i,k }. The homogenous stepsize case is to set
are well-known in homogeneous stepsize selection for distributed subgradient algorithms for distributed optimization problems with weight-balanced graphs, e.g., [15] , [16] , [18] .
Remark 3.6: While weight-balanced graphs are considered in [14] , [15] , [18] , [23] and [24] , we consider general (weightunbalanced) digraphs, and provide a heterogeneous stepsize design method for the desired Nash equilibrium convergence.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we start with homogeneous stepsizes to achieve a Nash equilibrium for weight-balanced graphs (in Section IV-A). Then we focus on a special weight-unbalanced case to show how a homogeneous-stepsize algorithm may fail to achieve our aim (in Section IV-B). Finally, we show that the heterogeneity of stepsizes can help us achieve a Nash equilibrium in some weight-unbalanced graph cases (in Section IV-C).
A. Weight-Balanced Graphs
Here we consider algorithm (4) with homogeneous stepsizes α i,k = β i,k = γ k for weight-balanced digraphs. The following result, in fact, provides two sufficient conditions to achieve a Nash equilibrium under switching weight-balanced digraphs.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose A1-A5 hold and digraph G (k) is weight-balanced for k ≥ 0 and = 1, 2. Then the multi-agent network Ξ achieves a Nash equilibrium by algorithm (4) with the homogeneous stepsizes {γ k } if either of the following two conditions holds:
The proof can be found in Section V-B.
Remark 4.1:
The authors in [23] developed a continuoustime dynamical system to solve the Nash equilibrium computation problem for fixed weight-balanced digraphs, and showed that the network converges to a Nash equilibrium for a strictly convex-concave differentiable sum objective function. Different from [23] , here we allow time-varying communication structures and a non-smooth objective function U . The same result may also hold for the continuous-time solution in [23] under our problem setup, but the analysis would probably be much more involved.
B. Homogenous Stepsizes vs. Unbalanced Graphs
In the preceding subsection, we showed that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved with homogeneous stepsizes when the graphs of two subnetworks are weight-balanced. Here we demonstrate that the homogenous stepsize algorithm may fail to guarantee the Nash equilibrium convergence for general weight-unbalanced digraphs unless certain conditions about the objective function hold.
Consider a special case, called the completely identical subnetwork case, i.e., Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are completely identical
In this case, agents ω i , ω can be viewed as one agent labeled as "i". Then algorithm (4) with homogeneous stepsizes {γ k } reduces to the following form:
Similar distributed saddle point computation algorithms have been proposed in the literature, for example, the distributed saddle point computation for the Lagrange function of constrained optimization problems in [18] . In fact, algorithm (6) can be used to solve the following distributed saddle-point computation problem: consider a network Ξ 1 consisting of n 1 agents with node set V 1 = {1, . . . , n 1 }, its objective is to seek a saddle point of the sum objective function
in a distributed way, where f i can only be known by agent i. In (6), (x i , y i ) is the state of node "i." Moreover, algorithm (6) can be viewed as a distributed version of the following centralized algorithm:
which was proposed in [13] to solve the approximate saddle point problem with a constant stepsize.
We first show that, algorithm (4) with homogeneous stepsizes [or equivalently (6) ] cannot seek the desired Nash equilibrium though it is convergent, even for fixed weight-unbalanced graphs.
Theorem 4.2: Suppose A1, A3-A5 hold, and f i , i = 1, . . . , n 1 are strictly convex-concave and the graph is fixed with G 1 (0) strongly connected. Then, with (6) , all the agents converge to the unique saddle point, denoted as ( x, y), of an objective function
is the Perron vector of the adjacency matrix
The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 4.1, by replacing
U (x, y) with , y) , respectively. Therefore, the proof is omitted.
Although it is hard to achieve the desired Nash equilibrium with the homogeneous-stepsize algorithm in general, we can still achieve it in some cases. Here we can give a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve a Nash equilibrium for any UJSC switching digraph sequence. Theorem 4.3: Suppose A1, A3-A5 hold and f i , i = 1, . . . , n 1 are strictly convex-concave. Then the multi-agent network Ξ achieves a Nash equilibrium by algorithm (6) for any UJSC switching digraph sequence G 1 if and only if f i , i = 1, . . . , n 1 have the same saddle point on X × Y .
The proof can be found in Section V-C.
Remark 4.3:
The strict convexity-concavity of f i implies that the saddle point of f i is unique. From the proof we can find that the necessity of Theorem 4.3 does not require that each objective function f i is strictly convex-concave, but the strict convexityconcavity of the sum objective function
C. Weight-Unbalanced Graphs
The results in the preceding subsections showed that the homogenous-stepsize algorithm may not make a weightunbalanced network achieve its Nash equilibrium. Here we first show the existence of a heterogeneous-stepsize design to make the (possibly weight-unbalanced) network achieve a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4: Suppose A1, A3, A4 hold and U is strictly convex-concave. Then for any time-varying communication graphs G , = 1, 2 and G that satisfy A2, there always exist stepsize sequences {α i,k } and {β i,k } such that the multi-agent network Ξ achieves a Nash equilibrium by algorithm (4).
The proof is in Section V-D. In fact, it suffices to design stepsizes α i,k and β i,k as follows:
where (α
Remark 4.4:
The stepsize design in Theorem 4.4 is motivated by the following two ideas. On one hand, agents need to eliminate the imbalance caused by the weight-unbalanced graphs, which is done by {1/α i k }, {1/β i k }, while on the other hand, agents also need to achieve a consensus within each subnetwork and cooperative optimization, which is done by {γ k }, as in the balanced graph case.
Remark 4.5: Condition (8) can be satisfied by letting
Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 4.4 we find that, if the sets X and Y are bounded, the system states are naturally bounded, and then (8) can be relaxed as A5.
Clearly, the above choice of stepsizes at time k depend on the adjacency matrix sequences {A 1 (s)} s≥k+1 and {A 2 (s)} s≥k+1 , which is not so practical. Therefore, we will consider how to design adaptive algorithms to update the stepsize sequences {α i,k } and {β i,k } such that the Nash equilibrium can be achieved, where the (heterogeneous) stepsizes at time k just depend on the local information that agents can obtain before time k.
Take
where {γ k } satisfies (8) . The only difference between stepsize selection rule (9) and (7) is
Note that (α The next theorem shows that, in two standard cases, we can design distributed adaptive algorithms satisfying (10) and (11) to ensure that Ξ achieves a Nash equilibrium. How to design them is given in the proof.
Theorem 4.5: Consider algorithm (4) with stepsize selection rule (9) . Suppose A1-A4 hold, U is strictly convex-concave. For the following two cases, with the adaptive distributed algorithms satisfying (10) and (11), network Ξ achieves a Nash equilibrium.
(i) For = 1, 2, the adjacency matrices A (k), k ≥ 0 have a common left eigenvector with eigenvalue one; (ii) For = 1, 2, the adjacency matrices A (k), k ≥ 0 are switching periodically, i.e., there exist positive integers p and two finite sets of stochastic matrices
The proof is given in Section V-E. Remark 4.6: Regarding case (i), note that for a fixed graph, the adjacency matrices obviously have a common left eigenvector. Moreover, periodic switching can be interpreted as a simple scheduling strategy. At each time agents may choose some neighbors to communicate with in a periodic order.
Remark 4.7:
In the case of a fixed unbalanced graph, the optimization can also be solved by either reweighting the objectives [39] , or by the subgradient-push protocols [41] , [42] , where the Perron vector of the adjacency matrix is required to be known in advance or each agent is required to know its out-degree. These requirements may be quite restrictive in a distributed setting. Theorem 4.5 shows that, in the fixed graph case, agents can adaptively learn the Perron vector by the adaptive learning scheme and then achieve the desired convergence without knowing the Perron vector and their individual out-degrees.
When the adjacency matrices A (k) have a common left eigenvector, the designed distributed adaptive learning strategy (43) can guarantee that the differences betweenα
asymptotically tend to zero. The converse is also true for some cases. In fact, if the time-varying adjacency matrices are switching within finite matrices and lim k→∞ (α (11) is not true. According to Theorem 4.2, the learning strategy (43) can make (x i (k), y i (k)) converge to the (unique) saddle point of the function
which is not necessarily the saddle point of
V. PROOFS
In this section, we first introduce some useful lemmas and then present the proofs of the theorems in last section.
A. Supporting Lemmas
First of all, we introduce two lemmas. The first lemma is the deterministic version of Lemma 11 on page 50 in [6] , while the second one is Lemma 7 in [15] .
Lemma 5.1: Let {a k }, {b k }, and {c k } be non-negative sequences with
Lemma 5.2: Let 0 < λ < 1 and {a k } be a positive sequence. (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) ∈ S + n . Without loss of generality, we assume μ 1 = min 1≤i≤n μ i (otherwise we can rearrange the index of agents). Let B be a stochastic matrix such that the graph G B associated with B is a directed cycle: 1e n n · · · 2e 1 1 with e r = (r+1, r), 1 ≤ r ≤ n−1 and e n = (1, n) .
Let b 11 = b * 11 with 0 < b * 11 < 1. Clearly, there is a solution to (12):
Then the conclusion follows.
The following lemma is about stochastic matrices, which can be found from Lemma 3 in [7] .
Lemma 5.4: Let B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n be a stochastic matrix and
We next give a lemma about the transition matrix sequence i, the entries Φ (k, s) ij , j = 1, . . . , n converge to the same limit φ j (s) at a geometric rate, i.e., for every i = 1, . . . , n and all s ≥ 0
The following lemma shows a relation between the left eigenvectors of stochastic matrices and the Perron vector of the limit of their product matrix.
Lemma 5.6: Let {B(k)} be a sequence of stochastic matrices. Suppose B(k), k ≥ 0 have a common left eigenvector μ corresponding to eigenvalue one and the associated graph sequence {G B(k) } is UJSC. Then, for each s
Proof: Since μ is the common left eigenvector of B(r), r ≥ s associated with eigenvalue one, μ lim k→∞ B(k) · · · B(s) = lim k→∞ μ B(k) · · · B(s)= μ . In addition, by Lemma 5.5, for each s, the limit lim k→∞ B(k) · · · B(s)
=: 1φ (s) exists. Therefore, μ = μ (1φ (s)) = (μ 1)φ (s), which implies (μ 1)φ(s) = μ. The conclusion follows.
Basically, the two dynamics of algorithm (4) are in the same form. Let us check the first one
By treating the term containing y j (j ∈ V 2 ) as "disturbance," we can transform (13) to a simplified model in the following form with disturbance i :
The next lemma is about a limit for the two subnetworks. Denoteᾱ Proof: We will only show lim k→∞ᾱk max 1≤i≤n 1 |x i (k)− x| = 0 since the other one aboutβ k can be proved similarly. At first, it follows from lim k→∞ᾱk (14) and A3 (ii) we obtain
s=0ᾱ s and then, for each k
Taking the limit over both sides of the preceding inequality yields the conclusion.
We assume without loss of generality that m 1 = 1 in the sequel of this subsection for notational simplicity. Denote x(k) = (x 1 (k), . . . , x n 1 (k)) , (k) = ( 1 (k) , . . . , n 1 (k)) . Then system (14) can be written in a compact form
Recall transition matrix
Therefore, for each k
At the end of this section, we present three lemmas for (4) (or (14) and the other one for y). The first lemma gives an estimation for h 1 (k) = max 1≤i,j≤n 1 
Lemma 5.8: Suppose A2 (ii), A3 and A4 hold. Then for = 1, 2 and any t ≥ 1, 0 ≤ q ≤ T − 1
tT +q−1
where λ 1 r =ᾱ r , λ 2 r =β r , T = (n (n − 2) + 1)T for a constant T given in A2 and L as the upper bound on the subgradients of objective functions in A4.
Proof: Here we only show the case of = 1 since the other one can be proven in the same way. Consider n 1 (n 1 − 2) + 1 time intervals [0,
. By the definition of UJSC graph, G 1 ([tT 1 , (t + 1)T 1 − 1]) contains a root node for 0 ≤ t ≤ n 1 (n 1 − 2). Clearly, the set of the n 1 (n 1 − 2) + 1 root nodes contains at least one node, say i 0 , at least n 1 − 1 times. Assume without loss of generality that i 0 is a root node of
Take j 0 = i 0 from V 1 . It is not hard to show that there exist a node set {j 1 , . . . , j q } and time set {k 0 , .
Noticing that the diagonal elements of all adjacency matrices are positive, and moreover, for matrices 
r which shows (16) for = 1, t = 1, q = 0. Analogously, we can show (16) for = 1, 2 and t ≥ 1, 0 ≤ q ≤ T − 1. Lemma 5.9: Suppose A2 (ii), A3 and A4 hold.
then the subnetworks Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 achieve a consensus, respectively, i.e., lim k→∞ h 1 (k) = 0, lim k→∞ h 2 (k) = 0. Note that (i) is an extension of Lemma 8 (b) in [15] dealing with weight-balanced graph sequence to general graph sequence (possibly weight-unbalanced), while (ii) is about the consensus within the subnetworks, and will be frequently used in the sequel. This lemma can be shown by Lemma 5.8 and similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 8 in [15] , and hence, the proof is omitted here.
The following provides the error estimation between agents' states and their average.
Lemma 5.10: Suppose A2-A4 hold, and {ᾱ(k)}, {β(k)} are non-increasing with
Proof: We only need to show the first conclusion since the second one can be obtained in the same way. At first, from A3 (iii) and
Let {s ir , r ≥ 0} be the set of all moments when
where T is the constant in A2 (i). Thus, the preceding inequality and (17) imply
Then, from the non-expansiveness property of the convex projection operator
Based on (18), the non-increasingness of 
B. Proof of Theorem 4.1
We complete the proof by the following two steps.
Step 1: We first show that the states of (4) are bounded. Take (x, y) ∈ X × Y . By (4) and (1) 
It is easy to see that | · | 2 is a convex function from the convexity of | · | and the convexity of scalar function h(c)= c 2 
. From this and A3
Thus, based on (19) and A4,
This imply
Hence, by (20)- (22) |x
It follows from the weight balance of G 1 (k) and A3 (ii) that (23), we have
Then adding (24) and (25) together leads to
k < ∞ and Lemmas 5.9, 5.10
Therefore, by virtue of (28), (26) and
is a finite number, denoted as ξ(x * , y * ). Thus, the conclusion follows.
Step 2: We next show that the limit points of all agents satisfy certain objective function equations, and then prove the Nash equilibrium convergence under either of the two conditions: (i) and (ii).
As shows in Step 1, (x i (k), y i (k)), k ≥ 0 are bounded. Moreover, it also follows from (26) that
and then by
The stepsize condition (29) imply lim inf k→∞ Υ(k) = 0. As a result, there is a subsequence
Let (x,ỹ) be any limit pair of {(x(k r ),ȳ(k r ))} (noting that the finite limit pairs exist by the boundedness of system states). Because U (x * , ·), U(·, y * ) are continuous and the Nash equilibrium point (x * , y * ) is taken from X * × Y * freely, the limit pair (x,ỹ) must satisfy that for
We complete the proof by discussing the proposed two sufficient conditions: (i) and (ii). 
for any x ∈ X, which yields a contradiction since U (·, y * 1 ) is strictly convex and then the minimizer of U (·, y * 1 ) is unique. Thus, X * × Y * contains only one single-point (denoted as (x * , y * )).
We check the existence of the two limits lim k→∞x (k) and lim k→∞ȳ (k).
Taking the gradient with respect to x on both sides of (31) yields 2n
Similarly, we can showỳ 1 =ỳ 2 . Thus, the limits,
We claim that (x,ỳ) ∈ X * ×Y * . First it follows from (24) that, for any x ∈ X,
Then U (x,ỳ) − U (x,ỳ) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X due to lim k→∞x (k) =x, lim k→∞ȳ (k) =ỳ, the continuity of U , and (32) . Similarly, we can show
Thus, the proof is completed.
C. Proof of Theorem 4.3
(Necessity) Let (x * , y * ) be the unique saddle point of strictly convex-concave function U on X × Y . Take μ = (μ 1 , . . . , μ n 1 ) ∈ S + n 1 . By Lemma 5.3 again, there is a stochastic matrix A 1 such that μ A 1 = μ and G A 1 is strongly connected. Let G 1 = {G 1 (k)} be the graph sequence of algorithm (4) with G 1 (k) = G A 1 for k ≥ 0 and A 1 being the adjacency matrix of G 1 (k). Clearly, G 1 is UJSC. On one hand, by Proposition 4.2, all agents converge to the unique saddle point of
On the other hand, the necessity condition states that lim k→∞ x i (k) = x * and lim k→∞ y i (k) = y * for i = 1, . . . , n 1 . Therefore, (x * , y * ) is a saddle point of
Because μ is taken from S + n 1 freely, we have that, for any μ ∈ S
We next show by contradiction that, given any i = 1, . . . , n 1 ,
, which contradicts the second inequality of (33) 
Analogously, we can show from the first inequality of (33) 
(Sufficiency) Let (x * , y * ) be the unique saddle point of (23), we have
Merging (23) and (34) gives
for a finite number ζ * , which implies that
From (35), we also have
γ k = ∞ implies that there is a subsequence {k r } such that
We assume without loss of generality that lim r→∞x (k r ) =x, lim r→∞ȳ (k r ) =ý for somex,ý (otherwise we can find a subsequence of {k r } recalling the boundedness of system states). Due to the finite number of agents and the continuity of f i s, there exists i 0 such that
It follows from the strict convexityconcavity of f i 0 thatx = x * ,ý = y * . Since the consensus is achieved within two subnetworks, lim r→∞ x i (k r ) = x * and lim r→∞ y i (k r ) = y * , which leads to ζ * = 0 based on (36) . Thus, the conclusion follows.
D. Proof of Theorem 4.4
We design the stepsizes α i,k and β i,k as that given before Remark 4.4. First by Lemma 5.5 (i) and (ii), the limit lim r→∞ Φ (r, k) = 1(φ (k)) exists for each k. Let (x * , y * ) be the unique Nash equilibrium. From (23) we have
Analogously
Denote
Then it follows from (37) and (38) that
∀i, k and then δ * is a finite number. Therefore
Then (39) can be written as
. (40) The subsequent proof is given as follows. First, we show that the designed stepsizes (7) can eliminate the imbalance caused by the weight-unbalanced graphs [see the second term in (40)], and then we prove that all the terms from the third one to the last one in (40) is summable based on the geometric rate convergence of transition matrices. Finally, we show the desired convergence based on inequality (40) , as (26) for the weightbalance case in Theorem 4.1.
Clearly, 1(φ (s + 1)) Λ s = 11 , = 1, 2. From Lemma 5.5 (iv) we also have that
Based on these observations, multiplying (1/n )1 on the both sides of (40) and taking the sum over = 1, 2 yield
=:
is the sum of all terms from the third one to the last one in (41).
We next show lim r→∞ sup k≥r (k, r) = 0. First by Lemmas 5.9, 5.10, and Remark 5.1,
Moreover, by Lemma 5.7, lim r→∞ γ r ς(r) = 0, which implies lim r→∞ sup k≥r+1
. From the preceding zero limit results, we have lim r→∞ sup k≥r (k, r) = 0. Then from (42) 
First it follows from lim r→∞ sup k≥r (k, r) = 0 that, for any ε > 0, there is a sufficiently large l 0 such that when l ≥ l 0 , sup k≥k l (k, k l ) ≤ ε. Moreover, since the consensus is achieved within the two subnetworks, l 0 can be selected sufficiently large such that
E. Proof of Theorem 4.5 (i). In this case we design a dynamics for auxiliary states
for i ∈ V 2 to estimate the respective desired stepsizes (9) . We can find that all lemmas involved in the proof of Theorem 4.4 still hold under the new stepsize selection rule (9) . Moreover, all the analysis is almost the same as that in Theorem 4.4 except that the new stepsize selection rule will yield an error term (denoted as (k, r)) on the righthand side of (39) . In fact
for a sufficiently large s.
where 2 − 1. Moreover, the above convergence is achieved with a geometric rate. Similar to the proof of case (i), we can prove case (ii). Thus, the conclusion follows.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide examples to illustrate the obtained results in both the balanced and unbalanced graph cases.
Consider a network of five agents, where n 1 = 3, n 2 = 2, We discuss three examples. The first example is given for verifying the convergence of the proposed algorithm with homogeneous stepsizes in the case of weight-balanced graphs, while the second one is for the convergence with the stepsizes provided in the existence theorem in the case of weight-unbalanced graphs. The third example demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed adaptive learning strategy for periodical switching unbalanced graphs. Clearly, with the above adjacency matrices, the three digraphs G 5 shows that the agents converge to the unique Nash equilibrium under the above designed adaptive stepsizes. 
VII. CONCLUSION
A subgradient-based distributed algorithm was proposed to solve a Nash equilibrium computation problem as a zero-sum game with switching communication graphs. Sufficient conditions were provided to achieve a Nash equilibrium for switching weight-balanced digraphs by an algorithm with homogenous stepsizes. In the case of weight-unbalanced graphs, it was demonstrated that the algorithm with homogeneous stepsizes might fail to reach a Nash equilibrium. Then the existence of heterogeneous stepsizes to achieve a Nash equilibrium was established. Furthermore, adaptive algorithms were designed to update the hoterogeneous stepsizes for the Nash equilibrium computation in two special cases.
